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Juan Rivera sits in a dimly lit visiting room at Stateville
Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois.' He is serving a life
sentence for the 1992 murder of eleven-year-old Holly Staker,' and
though he has been in prison for almost twenty years, it is
immediately clear that Juan does not belong here. Claims of
innocence are common in this place, but his claim is different.
During Juan's trial, the jury was presented with a pristine and
complete deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile recovered from
sperm found in the little girl's vagina after her death.3 "It was a
beautiful sample. It completely excluded Juan," says Jane Raley,
Juan's attorney.'
So why is Juan in prison? When investigators compared the
profile to DNA samples of known offenders from across the
country, they found no match.' Without the cinematic crescendo
that juries crave-there was no dramatic unveiling of the
murderer's true identity in open court-the fact that Juan's DNA
was not found at the crime scene was muddled into an otherwise
complex case.' Juan was convicted of murder and sent to live out
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1. Interview with Juan Rivera and Jane Raley, at Stateville Correctional





6. Id. The case was complicated by the fact that Juan allegedly confessed to
Holly's murder. However, this confession was riddled with problems-it was not
recorded; Juan was young and uneducated at the time of the confession, and
claimed he did not understand many of the words written in the confession; and he
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the rest of his days at Stateville.' Today, he waits for justice, and
the DNA profile found in the raped and murdered little girl waits
for its match. "I'm hanging on," says Juan.'
DNA has long been a valuable resource for the identification
of criminal suspects.! In light of increasing reliance on familial
DNA searches of state and national databases,"o it is necessary to
consider the effect these searches might have on the constitutional
rights of African Americans. When identifying a suspect through
DNA, a crime laboratory identifies "Short Tandem Repeats"
(STRs), patterns in an individual's genetic material that vary
considerably from one individual to another." STRs can be
recovered from forensic material found at a crime scene and
compared to genetic information stored in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)." If
STRs recovered from a crime scene match a profile's STRs in
CODIS, investigators can quickly identify a suspect who warrants
additional attention.1
Familial DNA testing changes this procedure only slightly.
The technique makes use of genetic similarities between closely
related individuals in order to identify suspects." Scientists and
investigators believe that this innovation could greatly expand the
scope and ability of CODIS." However, this technique could also
incorrectly reported several important facts about the crime. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In February of 1988, Tommy Lee Andrews became one of the first criminal
defendants in the United States to be convicted with the help of DNA evidence.
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the
conviction after finding "no other appellate decision addressing the admissibility of
DNA identification evidence in criminal cases"). For an early example of a decision
regarding the trustworthiness of DNA evidence, see People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d
956, 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (concluding that DNA forensic evidence tests are
reliable and meet the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence).
10. See Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their
Relatives, 312 Sci. 1315, 1316 (2006).
11. Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle
Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3,9 (2010).
12. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CODIS: COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-brochure-2010 [hereinafter
CODIS BROCHURE].
13. Id.
14. Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, a Tool to Make Arrests, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2008, at Al. For example, the alleged "Bind, Torture, Kill" (BTK)
killer Dennis Rader was identified when investigators compared DNA found at
BTK crime scenes with DNA found in Rader's daughter's medical records. Id.
15. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315-16 (hypothesizing that the use of
familial DNA searches could increase "cold hits," or unconfirmed identifications,
from ten to fourteen percent).
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result in more frequent identification of African American suspects
than suspects in other racial groups.'" While African Americans
comprise less than thirteen percent of the U.S. population,17
approximately forty percent of the DNA profiles in CODIS are
taken from African American individuals.'" Because familial DNA
searches make more extensive use of preexisting database content,
use of this technique will, in all likelihood, disproportionately
affect the African American community.19
This Article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
constitutionality of familial DNA testing in light of the dispro-
portionate effect it will likely have on African Americans. Part I of
this Article will first explain how genetic information is tradi-
tionally used to identify suspects in a criminal investigation, and
how this information is shared at the national level. Part I will
also explain how familial search techniques work, and why they
might lead to unfair scrutiny of African Americans. Part II will
evaluate the constitutionality of familial DNA techniques under
the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments. Part III will examine
how states have effectively handled familial DNA searching, and
why the federal government must clear the way for use of the
technique by the states. This Article concludes that familial DNA
testing is constitutional under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amend-
ments regardless of any potentially disproportionate effects on the
African American community, and therefore states must deter-
mine how they will utilize the technique. In the end, the use of
familial DNA testing is best left to the states because, though the
technique's federal constitutionality will likely be upheld, states
are better equipped to gauge the comfort level of voters, and the
workability of emerging practices.
I. Innovating at the Speed of Crime
Investigators use DNA to accurately tie suspects to forensic
evidence. To understand the constitutional implications of famil-
ial DNA testing, it is first necessary to look at how DNA is used to
identify individuals, and how the use of familial DNA expands the
reach of existing DNA databases. This expansion presents unique
constitutional concerns for the African American community.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, httpI/quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Nov. 4, 2010).
18. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders'Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHics 248, 258 (2006).
19. Id. at 258-59.
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A. DNA and the CODIS Database
DNA is composed of four building blocks, or bases.20 These
bases usually pair with one another predictably, forming a chain of
genetic material known as a chromosome.2' Along this chain,
researchers have identified several loci, which are specific genes'
locations on the chain.22 At each locus are two alleles, and every
person on earth has one allele from his or her mother and one
allele from his or her father." By looking at the same locus in
DNA from two different profiles, researchers are able to compare
the two profiles with incredible precision.24 Forensic DNA analysis
concentrates on base pairings at thirteen loci in the DNA sequence
where "the genetic material ... is not known to determine a
human attribute such as height, weight, or susceptibility to a
particular disease."25 This genetic material, while commonly
referred to as "junk DNA," can be extremely valuable to forensic
analysts for identification purposes.
The process to compare and match DNA profiles is relatively
straightforward. The genetic material most commonly used in
conjunction with criminal investigations is STR DNA,27 which is a
reliable identifier in humans for a variety of reasons.' This
20. Glossary, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/glossary/f?showpopup=1 (last
visited Mar. 6, 2011).
21. For an in-depth description of the pairings of genetic bases, see Jules
Epstein, "Genetic Surveillance"-The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA
Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 141, 143 ("In DNA, Cytosine is
normally paired with Guanine, while Thymine normally pairs with Adenine.").
22. OFFICE OF BIOLOGICAL & ENVTL. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE
GENE GATEWAY WORKBOOK 9 (2011), available at http://www.ornl.gov/
sci/techresourceslHumanGenome/posters/chromosomelggworkbook2.pdf ("The
Gene map locus describes where a gene can be found on a chromosome. For the
Gene locus 6p21.3, 6 is the chromosome number, p indicates the short arm of the
chromosome, and 21.3 is a number assigned to a particular region of the
chromosome.").
23. Gabel, supra note 11, at 10-11.
24. Id. at 26.
25. Epstein, supra note 21, at 143.
26. See Jacqueline K. S. Lew, The Next Step in DNA Database Expansion? The
Constitutionality of DNA Sampling of Former Arrestees, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 199, 204
(2005) (quoting Kincade v. United States, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004))
(defining "junk DNA" as "genetically non-informative DNA not presently
recognized as containing useful genetic programming material").
27. For a wider discussion of the differences between STR, Y STR, and mtDNA,
which falls outside the scope of this Article, see Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last
visited Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CODIS Fact Sheet].
28. Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR. FORENSICS,
http://www.forensicdnacenter.com/dna-str.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
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nuclear DNA is found in a wide variety of organic materials, as
well as everyday items with which these materials come into
contact."9 Most importantly, patterns found in STRs, or repeats,
are "highly variable among individuals," minimizing the chances
that they are shared by multiple people."0
STRs are also valuable because the quantification of repeats,
derived from the length of the DNA segment, can be easily
standardized and compared." According to the Canadian Parlia-
mentary Information and Research Service, "[t]he vast majority of
the genetic information in the human genome, much of which is
essential for life, is the same from one person to the next. How-
ever, certain regions of chromosomes exhibit high levels of varia-
tion among individuals, and these regions are used as DNA
'markers'. . . .3 2 The chromosomal information contained in STR
regions always varies from person to person, with the exception of
identical twins.33 "Despite this high specificity, the profile can be
described very concisely by simply listing the lengths of the varia-
tions found for each of the 13 markers."' A DNA profile is there-
fore "a series of numbers, each of which represents the result from
the analysis of a specific location on the chromosome . . . "" What
makes DNA such an effective identifier is that, despite the com-
plexity of isolating the material, technicians are really just com-
paring the length of loci from two different DNA samples, knowing
29. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NATL INST. OF
JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD KNow ABOUT DNA
EVIDENCE, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/bcOO0614.pdf (last visited
Apr. 17, 2011) ("DNA is contained in blood, semen, skin cells, tissue, organs,
muscle, brain cells, bone, teeth, hair, saliva, mucus, perspiration, fingernails, urine,
feces, etc."); Lew, supra note 26, at 204 (adding tooth pulp and bone marrow to the
list of organic materials from which DNA can be extracted); Forensic Identity,
LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/wps/portal/forensic/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2011)
(indicating that laboratories are able to glean useful genetic materials from "gum,
envelopes, weapons, rocks, and food products" along with "any type of evidence
sample"). In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court held that individuals do
not have an expectation of privacy in discarded materials, a concept often applied
to these genetically rich substances. 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
30. Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), supra note 28.
31. PARLIAMENTARY INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., NEW FRONTIERS IN FORENSIC
DNA ANALYSIS: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA 4
(2009).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. Justice for Sexual Assault Victims: Using DNA Evidence to Combat Crime:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 49 (2002) [hereinafter Justice for Sexual Assault Victims] (statement of




that these lengths vary from person to person." If the lengths
match at enough points along the chain, a genetic match exists."
Statistics are also an important facet in understanding DNA
and the role it plays in criminal investigations. Accurate statistics
are produced by determining "the frequency with which the com-
bination at a single locus occurs across the population" and then
calculating a 'random-match probability.'"" With this result, in-
vestigators can calculate the "probability that a randomly chosen
person, other than the suspect, has the genetic profile ... [.]"3
"[Ninety-nine] percent, that is how accurate DNA evidence is. One
in 30 billion are [sic] likely to be wrong . . . ."' Some DNA analysis
techniques available today, such as the SGM Plus and PowerPlex
16, provide the probability of just one in three trillion individuals,
and one in 2 x 10" individuals, respectively, sharing DNA pro-
files." The technology continues to move forward at a rapid pace.42
Technological advances alone, however, cannot solve crimes.
Though investigators know a DNA sequence is unique to the
donor, that DNA sample, by itself, cannot help investigators iden-
tify the donor.' It would be akin to having a clear picture of a sus-
pect's face from a security camera, but having no way to link that
face to a name, social security number, or address. DNA evidence
collected from a crime scene must be matched against a reference
sample taken from a known individual." It is essential, then, to
create and maintain a large profile pool." The national CODIS
database has filled this role, becoming an increasingly important
crime-fighting tool since the early 1990s." CODIS is actually an
36. See Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment: The
Time Has Come to Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant
Requirement and the Primary Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 319, 326-27
(2009) (discussing the differing lengths of STRs and how forensic scientists
compare these to known DNA profiles to establish identity).
37. Id. at 327.
38. Epstein, supra note 21, at 144.
39. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE
29 (1996).
40. Justice for Sexual Assault Victims, supra note 35, at 1 (statement of Sen.
Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs).
41. See Greg Hampikian, Advanced DNA Analysis: Innocence Network (2007)
(unpublished presentation), available at http://www.innocencenetwork.org/docs/
InnocNetworkAdvDNA3%202007workshop.pdf.
42. Gabel, supra note 11, at 46.
43. PARLIAMENTARY INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., supra note 31, at 2.
44. Id.
45. See Greely et al., supra note 18, at 251 ("[CODIS's] power seems certain to
increase as more DNA samples from offenders are taken, analyzed, and submitted
to CODIS.").
46. See CODIS BROCHURE, supra note 12 ("[CODIS] began as a pilot software
400 [Vol. 29:395
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aggregate of several DNA databases, and functions at the national
level through the National DNA Index System (NDIS).4 ' The
NDIS acts as a clearinghouse for DNA profiles uploaded by each
state and the District of Columbia through individual State DNA
Index Systems (SDIS)." The database can offer investigative
leads by linking crimes to one another through the analysis of
biological forensic material, thus allowing law enforcement
agencies to share information and coordinate investigations."
Forensic DNA profiles can be searched against the stored DNA
profiles of arrestees and convicted offenders.0 A traditional DNA
"match" refers to an instance in which two DNA samples share
each of the twenty-six alleles at the thirteen designated CODIS
loci." Thus, if the suspect's profile is stored in the NDIS, his or
her identity will be provided to investigators. 2 Law enforcement
agencies can then pursue the suspect through conventional means,
reinforcing their investigations with the evidentiary weight of the
profile match." DNA profile analysis can also work backwards,
exonerating the falsely accused or convicted by demonstrating that
they did not donate genetic material."
project in 1990 serving 14 state and local laboratories. The DNA Identification Act
of 1994 formalized the FBI's authority to establish a National DNA Index System
(NDIS) for law enforcement purposes.").
47. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27. For a state to become part of the NDIS,
the state must satisfy a number of requirements that ensure standardization. Id.
"(States] . . . agree to abide by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, which involves
recordkeeping procedures as well as quality control procedures. They follow a
national DNA index system procedures manual and they undergo proficiency
testing . .. and then agree to the reporting and confirmation of hits . . . ." Justice
for Sexual Assault Victims, supra note 35, at 19 (statement of Dwight E. Adams,
Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
48. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27; see Daniel J. Grimm, The Demographics
of Genetic Surveillance: Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1168 (2007) (indicating that by 2004 every state had linked
their SDIS with CODIS); Privacy Impact Assessment: National DNA Index System
(DNS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/
privacy-impact-assessments/dns (defining CODIS as the "automated DNA
information processing and telecommunication system that supports NDIS").
49. CODIS BROCHURE, supra note 12.
50. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
51. Grimm, supra note 48, at 1170.
52. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27 (explaining that once a candidate profile
is matched to an arrestee or convicted offender profile, "the laboratory will go
through procedures to confirm the match and, if confirmed, will obtain the identity
of the suspected perpetrator").
53. Id. (explaining that a DNA match can be used to establish probable cause,
allowing police officers to obtain a DNA sample from the suspect).
54. Justice for Sexual Assault Victims, supra note 35, at 30 (statement of Linda
A. Fairstein, Former Chief, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit, New York County
District Attorney's Office); How Many People Have Been Exonerated?, INNOCENCE
2011]1 401
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Before joining the NDIS network, a laboratory must be able
to process DNA profiles under national FBI guidelines.' For
forensic DNA profiles recovered in connection with criminal
investigations, investigators must attempt to identify all thirteen
"core loci" and generate results for at least ten loci in order to
submit results to, and search them against, the NDIS." In other
words, incomplete DNA profiles and profiles that have sustained
damage rendering fewer than ten loci suitable for comparison are
not accepted by the NDIS. To submit the profile of a convicted,
arrested, or detained individual, all thirteen core CODIS loci must
be identified." The NDIS contains "DNA profiles contributed by
federal, state, and local participating forensic laboratories,"' and
the network is constantly expanding." The system is currently
maintained by the FBI, and makes stored DNA profiles available
to state and federal law enforcement agencies." In addition to
providing FBI oversight, the DNA Identification Act of 199461
governs the storing and testing of DNA profiles."
Arrested individuals' DNA profiles are uploaded to the NDIS
database depending largely on the laws of the state in which the
individual was arrested.' The FBI is required to expunge DNA
profiles from the NDIS and state databases that were included "on
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/How-many-people-have-been_
exonerated-throughDNA testing.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) ("Since 1989,
more than 250 people in 34 states have been exonerated through post-conviction
DNA testing.").
55. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27. The FBI requires that profiles be
generated "in accordance with the FBI Director's Quality Assurance Standards"
and that accredited laboratories meet several external auditing requirements and
follow federal expungement procedures. Id. Additionally, "DNA data must meet
minimum loci requirements for the specimen category." Id.
56. See id. (presenting the thirteen "core CODIS loci").
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. CODIS BROCHURE, supra note 12. "All 50 states, the District of Columbia,
the federal government, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, and
Puerto Rico" add DNA profiles to the NDIS. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
60. See CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 14131-14134 (2006).
62. Id. § 14131; CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
63. CODIS BROCHURE, supra note 12 (specifying that arrestee profiles will be
added to the database only "if state law permits the collection of arrestee samples").
CODIS is given constitutional support for collecting these profiles by Justice
Harlan's oft-cited concurrence in Katz v. United States, which took note of a
diminished expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that societal and individual expectations of
privacy determine the extent of Fourth Amendment protections); see also Rise v.
Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (reiterating an individual's diminished
expectation of privacy upon being convicted of a felony).
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the basis of an arrest . .. if the Attorney General receives . . . a fi-
nal court order establishing that such charge has been dismissed
or has resulted in an acquittal or that no charge was filed within
the applicable time period."" The Director of the FBI is also re-
quired to remove from CODIS the "DNA analysis" of an individual
"if the Director receives, for each conviction of the person of a qua-
lifying offense, a certified copy of a final court order establishing
that such conviction has been overturned."65 In other words, if the
investigation is abandoned or the conviction overturned, the DNA
information is removed from the national database.
States must fulfill similar expungement obligations in order
to access the national database.' According to the DNA Identi-
fication Act, "a State shall promptly expunge from [its] index the
DNA analysis of a person included in the index by that State" if
state officials receive indication that the relevant conviction has
been overturned, no charge was filed within the required time
period, or the charge resulted in an acquittal or dismissal.67 These
expungement regulations are implemented in a variety of ways at
the state level, and state codes are not always consistent with
federal regulations.6 8 "[Miany databanking statutes depart from
the notion that civil privacy protections ought to be a default
policy."" Instead, six years after the passage of the DNA
Identification Act of 1994, just five states had passed laws re-
quiring the automatic expungement of profiles for individuals who
have been exonerated." California provides for "periodic audits of
[its] databanks for samples or records inappropriately retained.""
As of 2000, Illinois prohibited profile expungement under any
circumstances.72 DNA testing has also become a more frequent
occurrence upon arrest, further complicating expungement
procedures." Some state databases consequently contain DNA
64. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).
65. Id. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(i).
66. Id. § 14132(d)(2)(A).
67. Id.
68. See Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends
in DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 211 (2000) (noting that in the
majority of the thirty-nine state codes governing expungement practices,





73. See Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs, State DNA Database
Laws: Qualifying Offenses, DNAREsOURCE.COM (Sept. 2010), http://www.
dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses20l0pdf [hereinafter State DNA
2011] 403
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profiles of individuals who have never been convicted or have since
been exonerated of a crime. Thus, there is inconsistency as to
whether such profiles can be accessed at the national level." As a
result of the potential to inappropriately retain profiles, any
expansion of the database based on the existing content, such as
familial searches, would complicate these issues further.
CODIS maintains a remarkable success rate in the
identification of suspects based on genetic material left at crime
scenes.7 ' By 2002, the database played a role in "identifying a
suspect or linking serial crimes in nearly 5,000 investigations."76
The intricacies of a criminal investigation can be vastly simplified
by a CODIS match, or "hit."7 The national character of the data-
base also provides information that investigators could not
determine through conventional profiling." "For example, in New
York, one rape involved an elderly woman, the other, the rape of a
7-year-old, and yet DNA linked these two crimes together, linked
two crimes that likely would not have been seen to have been
committed by the same individual, according to investigators."79
CODIS's strength is the ability to synthesize large amounts of
information from diverse sources to create a usable piece of in-
formation." The database "form[s] a system of interconnected
'libraries' against which samples of unknown origin are com-
pared."" On the whole, "the success of CODIS is largely attrib-
utable to the cooperative efforts of the criminal justice community,
Database Laws]. As of September 2010, twelve states required that DNA samples
be taken from individuals arrested for any felony offense, even if they are not
convicted. Id. Additionally, while most states require DNA sampling from
individuals arrested for misdemeanors of a sexual nature, four states currently
mandate sampling for a variety of non-sexual misdemeanor offenses. Id. The data
also show that all states except Idaho require individuals convicted of felonies to
have their DNA sampled and archived. Id. All states except Georgia require DNA
sampling upon serving a felony jail and/or probation term. Id.
74. See Kimmelman, supra note 68, at 211.
75. See Justice for Sexual Assault Victims, supra note 35, at 11 (statement of
Dwight E. Adams, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) (detailing various successes of CODIS in identifying suspects).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., id. Using this technique, a 1998 California rape was linked to four





81. Randall S. Murch, Forensic Perspective on Bioterrorism and the
Proliferation of Bioweapons, in FIREPOWER IN THE LAB: AUTOMATION IN THE FIGHT




law enforcement, victims, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners,
prosecutors, and, of course, the crime laboratory personnel,
Federal, State, and local crime laboratories." It has become clear
in the last twenty-five years that DNA analysis is now an
indispensible criminal justice tool, and the development of CODIS
is essential to the technique's success.
B. Familial DNA Searches: Expanding the Capabilities of
CODIS
The reach of CODIS and NDIS could exponentially expand
with the help of familial DNA techniques. By some estimates, the
use of familial DNA searches could increase "cold hits" by forty
percent, a precious advantage during the investigation of violent
crimes." Familial DNA testing looks at concrete similarities
between DNA profiles to identify close relatives of the profile
donor.' Related individuals' DNA profiles exhibit similarities
beyond those exhibited by the population at large." The results of
this genetic similarity can be seen everywhere-families look alike
and share medical characteristics because they also share genetic
material.' These similarities break down increasingly as the
familial relationship becomes more attenuated. Familial DNA
testing is therefore used to identify suspects that are "first-degree
relatives"' of the DNA profile donor."
Allele matches in highly variable areas of DNA, even when
82. Justice for Sexual Assault Victims, supra note 35, at 11 (statement of
Dwight E. Adams, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
83. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315-16.
84. Nakashima, supra note 14, at A9.
85. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315.
86. Gabel, supra note 11, at 19; see Greely et al., supra note 18, at 251-53
(estimating that on average 16.7 of the twenty-six alleles at CODIS loci are shared
by siblings, while the general population shares an average of 8.7 alleles at CODIS
loci); Kimberly A. Wah, A New Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an
Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 909, 947 (2008) (citing studies
finding that full siblings share an average of four loci, while the general population,
on average, shares less than one loci).
87. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 251-52 ("Second degree relatives-uncles or
aunts and nephews or nieces, grandparents and grandchildren, half-brothers and
half-sisters-share one quarter of their DNA variations by descent; third degree
relatives (first cousins or great-grandparents and great-grandchildren, among
others) share one-eighth.").
88. Id. at 259 (defining first-degree relatives as parents, siblings, and children).
89. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315 ("Our simulations demonstrate that
kinship analysis would be valuable now for detecting potential suspects who are




they occur at fewer than thirteen loci, are strongly indicative of a
familial relationship between donors of the test profile and the
database profile.' Where an ordinary DNA test requires a match
of twenty-six alleles at thirteen loci, "[a] match on at least sixteen
alleles, especially if they involve a rare one, could indicate that a
close relative left a sample."" Law enforcement officials have long
been intrigued by similarities found between imperfectly matched
DNA profiles.9 2 Until recently, however, DNA database software
in the United States was not formatted to notice or report these
patterns.93 The advent of familial DNA testing in a criminal
justice context, therefore, changed the manner in which CODIS
software reports its findings, not the manner in which it searches
the database." The similarities between ordinary DNA testing
and familial DNA testing might create the perception that familial
DNA testing is familiar and therefore legitimate.
Investigators have used familial DNA testing under different
circumstances for a number of years. "Although direct compari-
sons of DNA profiles of known individuals and unknown biological
evidence are most common, indirect genetic kinship analyses,
using the DNA of biological relatives, are often necessary for hu-
manitarian mass disaster and missing person identifications."" In
Britain, home to the largest DNA database in the world,' law
enforcement officials have used the technique successfully for
97years.
90. Epstein, supra note 21, at 146 ("[W]hen such a high correspondence is
found, it often means that the perpetrator is a close relation of the individual in the
DNA index."). A correspondence of eleven or twelve loci is often indicative of a close
familial relationship. Id.
91. Nakashima, supra note 14, at A9.
92. See id. at Al, A9 (describing the emergence of familial DNA testing).
93. Epstein, supra note 21, at 146 ("In a typical DNA search, the profile from
the pertinent crime-scene evidence is uploaded, and the CODIS software
determines whether there is a 'hit,' i.e., a match at all thirteen loci. Until 2006, a
correspondence at either twelve or eleven loci, with disparities at the remaining
location(s), went unreported."); Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, Tracing a Suspect
Through a Relative, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at Al ("The FBI software was not
designed to find relatives, and a standard search accidentally eliminates more than
99.9% of relatives while often fingering people whose profiles are similar by pure
chance, experts say.").
94. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 146-47 (describing the process of
"prioritization" used to determine which partial matches are most likely to be close
relatives of the forensic profile submitted to CODIS).
95. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315 (footnote omitted).
96. Nigel Morris, The Big Question: Why Is Britain's DNA Database the Biggest
in the World, and Is It Effective?, INDEP. (London), Nov. 12, 2009, at 42, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-question-why-is-
britains-dna-database-the-biggest-in-the-world-and-is-it-effective-1818878.html.
97. See, e.g., Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315 ("[T]he brutal 1988 murder of
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C. A View from the African American Community
The African American community represents just 12.9% of
the total population of the United States, roughly one-sixth the
size of the White population." However, more than 28% of arrests
across the country for all categories of crime are of African Amer-
icans.' Racial disparities become more evident when these statis-
tics are broken down by the type of crime.' For instance, African
Americans represented 49.3% of arrests for murder and non-negli-
gent manslaughter in 2009.101 Over 32% of those arrested for for-
cible rape and 23.8% of individuals arrested for other sex offenses
were African American. 0 2 Incarceration rates exemplify similar
disparities."o' African Americans made up 39% of the jail and
prison population in 2009, and African American males faced a
32% chance of serving time in prison at some point in their lives."
Given DNA profile reporting laws, it is clear that a majority
of individuals incarcerated for violent crimes such as murder, non-
negligent homicide, rape, and sexual crimes will be required to
submit a DNA sample to state and national databases."' As
discussed above, even after acquittal or dismissal of charges,
expungement remains a challenge, and success depends largely on
16-year-old Lynette White . . . was finally solved in 2003. A search of the U.K.
National DNA Database for individuals with a ... rare allele found in crime scene
evidence . . . identified a 14-year-old boy with a similar overall DNA profile. This
led police to his paternal uncle, Jeffrey Gafoor.") (footnote omitted). Gafoor later
confessed and was convicted of the murder. Id.
98. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 17 (detailing that the population of
the United States in 2009 was composed of ethnicities and races in the following
proportions: 79.6% White; 12.9% Black; 1% American Indian and Alaska Native;
4.6% Asian; 0.2% Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander; 1.7% individuals
reporting two or more races; 15.8% persons of Hispanic or Latino origin; and 65.1%
non-Hispanic White).
99. See Uniform Crime Reports: Table 43: Arrests by Race, 2009, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2009 (last
modified Sept. 2010) (follow "Go to Arrest Tables" hyperlink under "Persons
Arrested" tab; then follow "Table 43" hyperlink under "Arrest Data Tables" tab).
100. This disparity is especially true when considering crimes that use DNA
evidence as part of a criminal investigation. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. For a detailed summary of prison demographics and statistics, see Facts
About Prison and Prisoners, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, (Dec. 2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/incfactsAboutPriso
ns Dec2010.pdf.
104. Id. Data also indicate that "[o]ne in ten black males aged 25-29 was in
prison or jail in 2009." Id.
105. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006) (facilitating the exchange of DNA
identification information), with State DNA Database Laws, supra note 73
(identifying the convictions and arrests that qualify for inclusion in DNA
databases).
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the policies of the state administering the database.'"
Unsurprisingly, African American DNA profiles constitute an
incongruent proportion-roughly forty percent--of DNA databases
at the state and national levels."o "[Tihe percentage of African-
Americans who might be identified as suspects through [familial
DNA searches] would be roughly four to five times as high as the
corresponding percentage of U.S. Caucasians. . . .,,0s
Some academics predict that the widespread use of familial
DNA search techniques could lead to "a new category of people
effectively .. . placed under lifetime genetic surveillance" without
ever being convicted of a crime."' This group's "composition would
reflect existing demographic disparities in the criminal justice
system, in which arrests and convictions differ widely based on
race, ethnicity, geographic location, and social class.""' However,
there is a bright side to this disparity. Because an uneven portion
of the nation's prison population is African American, this mi-
nority community stands to benefit from recent exonerations made
possible by traditional and familial DNA techniques."' The Su-
preme Court has peripherally addressed similar issues.112 By
examining the lopsided experiences of the African American com-
106. Kimmelman, supra note 68, at 211 (arguing that the burden has been
placed on the acquitted or exonerated individual to pursue expungement of his or
her DNA profile from the state and national database systems).
107. Grimm, supra note 48, at 1176 ("[W]e assume, based on the felony
conviction statistics, that African-Americans make up at least forty percent of the
CODIS Offender Index, or roughly 1.1 million people out of 2.75 million.").
108. Greely et al., supra note 18, at 259 (hypothesizing an increased rate of
African American identification if CODIS continues its use of current loci).
109. Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1316.
110. Id. The fear of decentralized DNA searches disproportionately targeting
socio-economically disadvantaged individuals has been noted in several
publications. For a discussion on disproportionate effects on the Hispanic
community, see Grimm, supra note 48, at 1175-80. For a discussion on how this
affects the African American community, see Greely et al., supra note 18, at 258-
59.
111. Compare Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.
sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011)
(estimating that sixty percent of the national prison population is composed of
minorities), with Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (showing a sharp
increase in the rate of exonerations in the United States since the advent of DNA
analysis).
112. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987) (holding that the
petitioner failed to demonstrate that decisionmakers acted with discriminatory
purpose in his case); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1975) (holding that
racially disparate impacts shall not be the "sole touchstone" of racial
discrimination); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that a
statute enforced with an "evil eye and uneven hand" will not be upheld). See infra
Part II.A for further discussion.
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munity with criminal justice systems, it is possible to anticipate
potential problems with the expansion of DNA databases. It is
also possible to examine potential benefits of new technologies.
II. Familial DNA and the Founding Fathers: A Sound
Constitutional Foundation
The use of familial DNA searches has several constitutional
implications. Ultimately, the constitutionality of familial DNA
testing is supported by both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Fourth Amendment. The implementation of familial DNA search
techniques will likely survive inevitable constitutional challenges.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Support for Familial DNA
Searches
There is a distinct possibility that the use of familial DNA
testing will be challenged as having a disproportionate effect on
the African American community. Because African Americans are
already disproportionately represented in the CODIS database,
expanding the ability to search relatives of individuals in the
database would subject increased numbers of African Americans,
including those with no criminal records, to surveillance without
an independent cause for suspicion."' However, Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"4 supports the constitutionality of
familial DNA testing.
Any progress made under the Equal Protection Clause
regarding statistical disproportionality was thoroughly abated by
the Supreme Court's holding in Washington v. Davis."5  Justice
White's opinion established that while racially disproportionate
impact "is not irrelevant ... it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations."" 6 Justice
113. Compare Grimm, supra note 48, at 1176 (hypothesizing that approximately
forty percent of the CODIS database is composed of DNA profiles taken from
African American individuals), with Greely et al., supra note 18, at 258-59
(predicting an increased rate of African American identification under current
CODIS techniques).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
115. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
116. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
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White continued that an "invidious discriminatory purpose" may
be inferred from the fact that "the law bears more heavily on one
race than another.""' Still, the Supreme Court has not held that a
facially neutral law that serves a legitimate government interest is
invalidated by the Equal Protection Clause based solely on a
racially disproportionate impact."" Instead, a "racially
discriminatory purpose" must be found."9
This line of "purpose, not effect" cases dates back to Yick Wo
v. Hopkins."0 In Yick Wo, the Court considered a San Francisco
city ordinance regulating the establishment and maintenance of
laundries."' Under the ordinance, it was illegal to operate a
laundry "without having first obtained the consent of the board of
supervisors. . . .""' While neutral on its face, and passed in
furtherance of a legitimate government interest, this law was
enforced in a manner designed to "drive out of business all the
numerous small laundries, especially those owned by Chinese, and
give a monopoly" to larger, Caucasian-owned businesses."' The
Court held that a facially neutral statute can nonetheless be
invalidated if it is enforced "with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances. . . In effect,
unequal enforcement can reveal a discriminatory purpose, but it is
the discriminatory purpose itself that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Familial DNA testing will be upheld under the Washington
and Yick Wo standards as long as it is implemented under a
constitutional government power, and does not subject specific
117. Id.
118. Id. ("[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race
than of another.").
119. Id. at 240.
120. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
121. See id. at 368.
122. Id. at 358. The statute exempted brick and stone structures, as it was
passed in response to the fear of fire in rapidly growing U.S. cities. Id. at 362. The
petitioner received a certification from the city's fire wardens indicating "that the
stoves, washing and drying apparatus, and the appliances for heating smoothing
irons, are in good condition, and that their use is not dangerous to the surrounding
property from fire . . . ." Id. at 358. These inspections were conducted in
accordance with an order prohibiting open flames in residential buildings. Id.
123. Id. at 362, 374 (stating that approximately two hundred applications from
Chinese-owned businesses were denied, while all but one of the applications from
Caucasian-owned businesses were granted).
124. Id. at 373-74.
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racial groups "to sample collection at a rate so suspiciously
disproportionate as to raise an inference of discriminatory
intent."'" Current familial DNA protocols and implementations
meet these requirements, as they are not collected, nor are they
distinguishable, based on racial or ethnic considerations. The laws
establishing CODIS and providing for its maintenance are facially
neutral, and make no mention of race.'
Furthermore, the use of familial DNA testing also satisfies
the broader test laid out under Yick Wo." 7 The STR DNA utilized
for CODIS identification purposes is largely acknowledged to be
"junk DNA" and is "not presently recognized as containing useful
genetic programming material."'28 STR DNA reveals precious few
personal attributes about the donor. In fact, the STR sites tar-
geted by law enforcement agents and CODIS administrators were
"purposely selected because they are not associated with any
known physical or medical characteristics,"'" but are still highly
variable between individuals.3 o It is therefore currently impos-
sible to determine an individual's race using the STR DNA
provided to crime laboratories."' This would also be true under
familial DNA testing circumstances.'32 Thus, the use of DNA
profiling, including familial techniques, provides more insulation
from the use of racial descriptions than would an eyewitness
account of a crime. "' It is not until the CODIS-certified laboratory
goes through statutorily required procedures, including a number
of double-blind features, that any identity would be
125. Grimm, supra note 48, at 1186 (hypothesizing that familial DNA testing
will survive equal protection review).
126. See CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27 (specifying the categories of DNA data
that may be maintained in CODIS, which do not include race or racial proxies as
considerations).
127. See 118 U.S. at 373-74.
128. Lew, supra note 26, at 204.
129. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000).
130. Lew, supra note 26, at 204.
131. Cf id. at 205 (explaining that many believe so-called "'junk DNA' is entirely
non-genic and uninformative"). However, some scientists maintain that "junk
DNA" may indeed reveal the "likelihood that the carrier is of a particular race or
sex." Id.
132. Cf CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27 (demonstrating that the STR DNA
data researchers would use to perform familial DNA searches are not categorized
or collected based on racial characteristics).
133. See Vivian Herrera et al., Examining the Cross-Race Effect Using Racially
Ambiguous Faces 1-4 (April 2000) (unpublished paper), available at
http://eyewitness.utep.edu/Documents/Herrera%20WPA%202000.pdf (finding that
the "cross-race effect," in which study participants "reliably demonstrateD that
other-race faces are more difficult to accurately recognize than same-race faces," is




Even if statistical data show a significant inflation in the
apprehension of African American individuals as a result of
familial DNA testing, a disparate impact in other words, the
technique will likely be upheld. In McCleskey v. Kemp,' the
Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in the face of statistics
indicating a racial disparity in the imposition of the death
sentence.' McCleskey, the petitioner, relied heavily upon a study
on racial disparities in the application of the death penalty,'37
which found that eleven percent of defendants convicted of
murdering a Caucasian victim received a death sentence,
compared to just one percent of those convicted of murdering an
African American."'
The Supreme Court stated that "to prevail under the Equal
Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers
in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."'" Statistical proof
is only accepted to prove intent to discriminate under limited
circumstances. 0  Death penalty cases are conducted under
conditions which vary a great deal from these scenarios.'' "Each
jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires
that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that
134. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27. The laboratory must first confirm the
match, then obtain the identity of the CODIS profile provider using the profile's
"Specimen Identification Number" before linking the profile to any individual. Id.
135. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
136. Id. at 279. McCleskey, a Black man from Georgia, was sentenced to death
after being convicted of killing a White police officer. Id. at 283-85.
137. Id. at 286. This study looked at the disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty based on the race of the victim and defendant in over 2000 murder cases.
See David Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
138. The study also found that "prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of
the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants
and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
139. Id. at 292.
140. Id. at 293. The Court limits the use of statistical proof of the discriminatory
effects of a statute to the following circumstances: jury selection, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and constitutional violations only under the most
infrequent of circumstances. Id. at 293-97. The court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins
and Gomillion v. Lightfoot as examples of these infrequent circumstances.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12. In Gomillion, a state legislature changed the
boundaries of a city to exclude 395 of 400 African American voters. 364 U.S. 339,
348 (1960).
141. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294 ("[Tjhe nature of the capital sentencing decision,
and the relationship of the statistics to that decision, are fundamentally different
from the corresponding elements in the venire-selection or Title VII cases.").
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vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant
and the facts of the particular capital offense."' Thus, one might
find statistical variability in the application of capital punishment
from race to race, but that might be a symptom of factors that the
jury permissibly considers, and not a symptom of discriminatory
intent. This process is akin to the decisionmaking process under
CODIS.'" In choosing to pursue a DNA profile match, CODIS
administrators follow a statutorily required process that is highly
specialized in order to avoid pursuing false matches. 4  It is
therefore likely that racial variability is a result of, not the motive
for, permissible DNA investigations.
McCleskey also challenged the imposition of the death
penalty by claiming that lawmakers and judges violated the Equal
Protection Clause when they provided for capital punishment
despite being aware of racially disproportionate results in its
implementation.4  The Court, however, rejected that argument
and cited Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,'"
which stated that "'[d]iscriminatory purpose'. . . implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker. . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'47 To be
discrimination, a law or policy had to have been motivated, at
least in part, by discrimination.
To succeed against CODIS's use of familial DNA testing, one
would have to prove not only that the technique has a racially
disparate impact, but also that CODIS administrators and investi-
gators chose to conduct familial DNA testing, at least in part, be-
cause of its disparate impact.'4 Such a contention would mischar-
acterize CODIS's operations, as the database makes use of only
142. Id.
143. See CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
144. Id. (explaining that once a match is found in the database, administrators
recheck the process used to match the candidate profile to the CODIS profile,
confirm the match, and only then do they obtain the identity of the candidate).
145. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297-98.
146. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
147. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (internal
citations omitted)).
148. Id. at 298 (finding that McCleskey failed to demonstrate that the legislature
"maintains the capital punishment statute because of the racially disproportionate
impact suggested by the Baldus study"); see, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80
(requiring proof that a law providing for the expedited promotion of veterans in
civil service positions was enacted because of a desire to reinforce stereotypes about
women in order to establish that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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"junk DNA" lacking any "useful genetic programming material." 4'
This blind reliance on the data, and not peripheral factors, ensures
that a disparate impact remains a result, not a motive.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that CODIS
administrators and law enforcement officials seek to adopt familial
DNA testing because of the racially disparate impact it might
have. If that were the case, the entire CODIS system, regardless
of whether familial testing was used, would be unconstitutional
simply because of the high proportion of minority DNA profiles in
the system. 15 Familial DNA testing uses the same genetic
information as conventional CODIS searches, and produces
similarly skewed results."' Despite the database's racial
composition, challenges to the constitutionality of profile collection
laws have been unsuccessful."' This may reflect the argument
that "databank configurations and resultant familial test results
are the natural byproduct of objective data collection."" In other
words, the forty percent representation of African Americans in
the national DNA database simply reflects the fact that forty
percent of the offenders whose profiles are statutorily required to
be uploaded onto CODIS are African American. This disparity is a
byproduct of the criminal justice system as a whole, stemming
from a multitude of legal and socioeconomic factors that serve to
create or reinforce racial disparities throughout society."' A
constitutional challenge to familial DNA testing would therefore
require an argument similar to the one so strongly rebuffed by the
Supreme Court in McCleskey."'
B. Familial DNA as an Accurate Component of Probable
Cause
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for the
149. Lew, supra note 26, at 204.
150. See Greely et al., supra note 18, at 258 (citing data indicating that at least
forty percent of the CODIS Offender Index is composed of African Americans).
151. Grimm, supra note 48, at 1176 (forecasting that familial testing would
make four percent of the Caucasian population, compared to seventeen percent of
African Americans, findable through the system).
152. Karen J. Maschke, DNA and Law Enforcement, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH
AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 45, 45-46 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008),
available at http://www.thehastingscenter.orgluploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing
Book/dna%20and%201aw%20enforcement%20chapter.pdf.
153. Grimm, supra note 48, at 1188.
154. Id.
155. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
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issuance of warrants." The use of DNA testing to compare a
CODIS profile to forensic evidence found at a crime scene
undoubtedly constitutes a "search" under some circumstances."'
In Katz v. United States,'" Justice Harlan's widely cited concur-
rence specified that a search occurs when an individual has a
subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." The individual must have also
"manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search."" These principles were applied in California
v. Greenwood,' which turned on the concept of society's
"accept[ance] as reasonable respondents' claim to an expectation of
privacy in trash left for collection in an area accessible to the
public."162 Consequently, the Court reasoned that the defendants
"exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.. .. [Riespondents placed
their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a
third party."" In doing so, they manifested a lack of the critical
reasonable expectation of privacy."*
This precedent applies to the various investigative
techniques employed in conjunction with familial DNA in different
ways. Familial DNA testing involves three DNA profiles: the
profile found at the crime scene; a relative's profile already stored
in CODIS; and the profile of the true suspect.'65 Therefore, the
156. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
157. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("[O]btaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search . . . ." (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (internal citation omitted)); Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that testing urine samples for
the presence of drugs was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment).
158. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
159. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (comparing a home, where there is a
legitimate and recognized expectation of privacy, to a conversation in public, where
there is not).
160. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
161. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
162. Id. at 41. Police officers asked a trash collector to deliver a suspect's
garbage to the police department based on reports of drug dealing out of the
residence. Id. at 37. "The officer searched through the rubbish and found items
indicative of narcotics use." Id. at 37-38.
163. Id. at 40.
164. Id. at 40-41.
165. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 14, at A5, A9 (explaining that the BTK
killer was caught by comparing DNA collected at the scenes of various crimes, for
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manner in which each DNA sample is obtained is a critical
component of Fourth Amendment analysis, as the expectation of
privacy is a fact-specific examination.
For instance, while investigating the Grim Sleeper serial
killer in Los Angeles, investigators made use of garbage discarded
by the suspect, Lonnie Franklin Jr.' "According to police, a DNA
sample taken from his son in an unrelated case was found to bear
a close resemblance to DNA found on the victims .... [D~etectives
then used a discarded cup with Franklin's DNA to make the
link,""' verifying the match with a piece of pizza Franklin threw
away." The suspect did not have a constitutionally acceptable
expectation of privacy for either item because he discarded them in
a public trash can, so collection and analysis were acceptable
within the Fourth Amendment guidelines expressed in
Greenwood.'69
As demonstrated, "[clonstitutional law offers virtually no
protection to suspects who are targeted for their abandoned
DNA .... [T]he Fourth Amendment focuses more on the physical
boundaries of persons and places than it does on the quantity of
information that may be found within them."' In other words,
Franklin's son had a diminished expectation of privacy in keeping
with other more conventional uses of CODIS."' The suspect, in
turn, had no expectation of privacy because he disposed of waste
that just happened to contain a sample of his DNA, like in
California v. Greenwood.17 ' Franklin had discarded his genetic
material into a garbage can "for the express purpose of conveying
it to a third party ... who might himself have sorted through
which the BTK killer claimed credit, to genetic material collected from the suspect's
daughter).
166. Rebecca Hall, "Grim Sleeper" Suspect Arrested at Least 15 Times,
KTLA.coM (July 10, 2010), http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-grim-sleeper-
arrest,0,4886952,full.story.
167. Id.
168. Naimah Jabali-Nash, "Grim Sleeper" Suspect Lonnie Franklin, Jr. Pleads
Not Guilty, CBS NEWS (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083-162-
20014446-504083.html.
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. Elizabeth E. Job, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment
and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 863 (2006).
171. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Previously
convicted individuals] do not have the same expectations of privacy in their
identifying genetic information that 'free persons' have. Once a person is convicted
of one of the felonies included as predicate offenses . . . his identity has become a
matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy. . .
172. 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988).
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respondents' trash or permitted others . .. to do so.""' Further-
more, he discarded a half-eaten piece of pizza, presumably in a
public trash receptacle."' "[W]here suspects 'knowingly expose'
items to public view, the Court has held that collection of such
evidence by the police falls outside the Fourth Amendment's
protections.""'
Familial DNA testing also survives constitutional challenges
based on the notion of "suspicionless searches.""' In City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,"' the Supreme Court ruled that six drug
interdiction roadblocks established by the Indianapolis Police
Department to "detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing" violated the
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights."' There is a recognized
"general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some
measure of individualized suspicion," and therefore a "general
interest in crime control" is not a valid justification for
establishing an interdiction checkpoint."' Checkpoints can be
instituted for specialized purposes, but not for the apprehension of
unknown individuals without specified suspicions. o
This restriction precisely exemplifies the value that familial
DNA testing holds for targeted and smart police work. There is
nothing "suspicionless" about an investigative lead born of a
familial DNA search. Instead, this information bears a more
substantive basis for suspicion than a traffic checkpoint that
makes use of generalized suspicion to control the border and
roadway safety. The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohiom held that
"in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."'82 If there is a familial DNA match, the chances are
173. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
174. Jabali-Nash, supra note 168.
175. Joh, supra note 170, at 863 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
176. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 41-42. Indianapolis Police established roadblocks that would
indiscriminately stop large numbers of vehicles without any specified suspicion. Id.
at 41.
179. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
180. Id. at 41 (listing border control and roadway safety as sufficiently
specialized purposes).
181. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
182. Id. at 21. An objective standard must be used to evaluate the
reasonableness of a search or seizure, specifically whether "the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Id. at 21-22.
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very strong that a first-degree relative of the DNA profile donor
will provide an exact match to the DNA sample.'" Investigators
can then further narrow that already-small group down by using
information about geographic proximity, age, general health, and
other factors before any suspects are actively pursued."*
Therefore, cases based on familial DNA leads hold a strong
likelihood of constitutionally endorsed suspicion.
The unconstitutional antithesis of a familial search is a "DNA
dragnet," which is almost entirely void of individualized
suspicion."' "A DNA dragnet is a police technique in which people
who fit a broad description of the perpetrator based on witness
accounts or, in some cases, live or work near the crime scene are
asked to provide DNA samples to investigators."'" DNA profiles
from those individuals are then compared to forensic profiles
recovered from crime scene evidence." A suspect's lack of
cooperation and often his or her unwillingness to volunteer a DNA
sample become a cause for suspicion." This process provides an
illustrative foil for familial DNA testing techniques, in which a
narrow group of closely related suspects is identified, and then
carefully whittled down to leave only plausible suspects under
l* * *189police suspicion.
It is clear that familial DNA testing raises constitutional
issues. The technique lies on a sturdy constitutional foundation,
and the legality of familial DNA testing will likely be confirmed in
the course of inevitable legal challenges. Within the confines of
the federal Constitution, the states should decide how best to use
this emerging technology for their own criminal justice needs.
183. See Bieber et al., supra note 10, at 1315 (noting that familial DNA testing is
useful in the detection of "potential suspects who are the parents, children, or
siblings of those whose profiles are in forensic databases").
184. See Maura Dolan, A New Tack in DNA Search, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at
Al (describing how investigators examined birth records and geographic data to
identify the offender's relative before providing the information to the police
department).
185. Kevin Bersett, Ex-Suspect Twice Cleared of Rape Demands Return of DNA




188. Glynn Wilson, In Louisiana, Debate Over a DNA Dragnet, CHRIsTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, Feb. 21, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0221/
p03s0l-usju.html ("In light of such cooperation, those who hesitate ... draw swift
notice.").
189. See id. (describing a case in which police tested nearly 1000 suspects for a
DNA match and cleared almost 800 suspects).
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III. Reserved to the States: Implementing Familial DNA
Searches at the State Level
Though familial DNA searches are constitutional at the
federal level, the technique's use nevertheless represents a
marked expansion of existing DNA databases. As a result, its
implementation is best left to the states, which are free to allow,
prevent, or restrict the use of familial DNA techniques within the
confines of federal and state constitutions. In doing so, state
legislatures can more accurately gauge the differing effects of this
expansion on local African American populations and provide
additional safeguards as needed.1" These safeguards can be as
simple as requiring the prompt expungement of an acquitted or
exonerated individual's DNA profile or can go as far as a statewide
ban on familial DNA searches if a legislature anticipates the
likelihood of racial impropriety. States should control this
technology for themselves.
No matter what states decide, some federal cooperation will
be necessary. Because familial DNA testing requires use of
CODIS in order to implement a search,1 91 it is necessary for
Congress and the FBI to clear the way for states that wish to
embrace the emerging technique. Currently, the FBI will not
allow states to use the national database to conduct familial DNA
searches.'92 The FBI remains bureaucratically uneasy about the
familial search process. Thomas Callaghan, the head of CODIS,
described the Bureau's apprehension in utilizing advanced
techniques without an explicit legislative endorsement, explaining
that "[the FBI would be more comfortable with congressional
authorization to conduct familial searches . . . ." "
Congressional approval of familial searches may now be in
the offing as a necessary step to implement use at the state level.
During the 111th Congress, Congressman Adam Schiff introduced
the Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act.'94 The bill
would allow the FBI to "conduct familial searches for DNA
samples collected from crime scenes in Federal investigations,"
allow state law enforcement agencies to request familial DNA
190. See supra Part I.C.
191. CODIS Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
192. Frank Green, Calif Congressman Wants FBI to Use Familial DNA
Searches, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2010, at B2 ("The FBI does not perform
the searches, but it does not stop states from doing so, provided they use their own
DNA database.").
193. Nakashima, supra note 14, at A9.




searches from the FBI, and provide for the protection of privacy
interests related to these advanced searches.'" The statute
defines a "familial match" as "a match of at least 1 shared allele at
15 loci between a DNA profile in the offender index and a DNA
sample collected at a crime scene" or "any other genetic association
the Attorney General determines is sufficient."'" The bill also
proposes a framework to restrict the use of familial searches."
This framework would require law enforcement officials to first
attempt conventional search techniques, and would apply only to
murder, voluntary manslaughter, a sexual offense committed
against a minor, a sex crime punishable by imprisonment for more
than a year, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses. 9
The statutory language would allow state and federal law
enforcement agencies to effectively use this emerging technology
only under serious circumstances that would warrant the
extensive search.'" It would also allow states to implement
additional safeguards.2 oo Congressman Schiff's proposal provides a
detailed and effective framework within which agencies would still
be free to make use of familial DNA techniques.20 ' The act would
safeguard the constitutional rights of individuals with DNA
profiles contained in CODIS, keeping CODIS practices well within
rights protected by the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments.
Though Congress has not voted on this bill, and the likelihood of
its reintroduction remains unclear, this bill should be passed so
that states will be free to use familial DNA searches without the
complications of a tentative federal bureaucracy and indeter-
minate constitutional challenges.
Several states have already taken steps to implement the use
of familial DNA testing. Colorado has led the charge into this
genetic frontier.202 Beginning in 2005, Denver District Attorney
Mitchell Morrissey took note of DNA profiles that closely
resembled, but did not match, profiles stored in the state's
database.' He soon convinced a hesitant FBI to adopt "an
interim policy that permitted states to pursue partial matches that
195. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A).
196. Id. § 2(d)(2).
197. Id. § 2(a)(2).
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See id. § 2(a)(3) (requiring state law enforcement agencies to establish their
own criteria and procedures to govern familial searches).
201. See id. § 2(a)(2).




turned up during routine database searches," enabling Morrissey
to pursue collaboration between states.2 0 Today, Colorado
conducts familial DNA searches and has offered to share the
state's familial DNA search software with other states willing to
collaborate.20' Several states have already had highly publicized
successes using the software.2" California's use of familial DNA
testing, for example, brought the decades-long hunt for the Grim
Sleeper serial killer to an end in 2010.207 Los Angeles's African
American community breathed a collective sigh of relief, as all
known victims were African American."
In addition to providing widespread positive press for the
technique, California's probe into the "Grim Sleeper" killings
demonstrates the additional precautions that states may take to
ensure the appropriate use of familial DNA searches. In 2008, the
California Department of Justice Bureau of Forensic Services
issued Information Bulletin 2008-BFS-01, which provides for the
release of the name of an offender "who is not the source of the
biological material from an unsolved case" only under specific
circumstances. 209 For example, if two profiles share at least fifteen
alleles, the related offender's name may be released in accordance
with state regulations.210 Of special significance is the California
204. Id.
205. See Frank Green, Familial DNA Hunt Sought in Rape Case, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 2010, at B1 ("Morrissey said Denver's software is available to
any jurisdiction willing to comply with appropriate protocols and precautions.");
Chelyen Davis, State Considers Using Familial DNA Searches,
FREDERICKSBURG.COM (Nov. 16, 2010), http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2010/
112010/11162010/588494 ("According to Lisa Schiermeier-Wood of the Virginia
Department of Forensic Science, familial DNA searches could cost about $165,000
in the first year, of which $100,000 would be for software and training. However,
the district attorney for Denver has offered Virginia, for free, the familial DNA
software his office developed.").
206. See Dolan & Felch, supra note 93, at Al.
207. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
208. Hector Becerra & Scott Gold, 'Everybody Knew Lonnie,' L.A. TIMEs, July 9,
2010, at A14 ("All of the victims Franklin has been charged with killing were young
African American women ... ..
209. Information Bulletin from Lance Gima, Chief, Bureau of Forensic Serv., to
All California Law Enforcement Agencies and District Attorneys Offices, on DNA
Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy 2 (2008), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms-attachments/press/pdfs/nl548_08-bfs-01.pdf.
210. Id. State regulations require, among other things, that a forensic profile be
a "single-source profile," that "all investigative leads have been exhausted" and the
case remains unsolved. Id. Also, the investigating agency must commit to continue
the investigation if the name is released, review non-forensic information to
determine the viability of the familial DNA lead, and get approval of a California




Department of Justice's committee review process, which made the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) "more comfortable" with
the familial DNA search process.2 The evaluation process is
consequently assigned to a law enforcement body.
Most importantly, the process is documented, minimizing the
chances that racial considerations play any role behind the closed
doors of a DNA laboratory. ACLU of Southern California staff
attorney Peter Bibring explained, "'[firom our perspective, if you
are going to use familial DNA searching, this is the kind of case
you should use it for, and the kind of precautions they took in this
case are the kind that should be taken.'"2 12 In light of recent high-
profile successes using the technique, the director of the ACLU of
Virginia concedes that "[1]ike nearly every advance in crime-
solving technology, this one will surely catch on."21 3 The manner
in which California and Colorado have implemented familial DNA
testing appears to effectively harness the potential criminal justice
benefits of the technique, while safeguarding citizens against
potential misuse.
Other states continue to debate implementation of familial
searches. Virginia, a state where an estimated twenty percent of
the population is African American, is weighing the benefits of
expanding its DNA database against the possible costs to civil
liberties.214 In August 2007, the Virginia Scientific Advisory
Committee's Subcommittee on Familial Searches met to discuss
acceptable rates for false positives using the technique, as well as
to determine "the size of the pool of reasonable, alternative sus-
pects to those who are identified by a database search."215 Though
state legislators have shown interest in allowing the use of these
searches to be 'case-driven' by investigators in very serious
crimes, rather than left to the discretion of database
211. Dolan, supra note 184, at Al.
212. Id. But see Peter Bibring, "Grim Sleeper" Case Doesn't Justify Expanding
the Reach of DNA Databases, DAILY Kos (July 15, 2010, 12:27 PM EDT),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/07/15/884569/-Grim-Sleeper-Case-Doesnt-
Justify-Expanding-the-Reach-of-DNA-Databases-, in which Bibring abandons his
support of California Department of Justice processes and criticizes familial DNA
testing as unjustified.
213. Frank Green, Use of Familial DNA Searches in Va. Debated, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 18, 2010, at Al.
214. Id. ("Asked if there were plans to pursue familial DNA searches, Peter
Marone, director of the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, said, 'This is
much more than a scientific issue.').
215. VA. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY CoMM.'s SUBcoMM. ON FAMILIAL SEARCHES,




administrators,"216 a healthy debate continues in Virginia217 and
elsewhere.218 There is little indication, however, that concerns
about race have played a significant role in any of these
conversations. Because familial DNA testing does not violate the
Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments, states may embrace
additional restrictions in order to provide their citizens with
supplementary safeguards if their electorates so desire.
Conclusion
Juan Rivera still waits in prison, and an orphaned DNA
sample still waits for its match.219 Familial DNA testing is a
valuable tool for law enforcement officials, and its use is likely to
expand in coming years. The technique makes use of the FBI's
extensive CODIS database by analyzing genetic similarities
between relatives in order to identify suspects where other
investigative leads have fallen short. While this expansion may
exacerbate the over-representation of African American DNA
profiles in the CODIS system, the technique is likely to survive
constitutional challenges. Familial DNA testing is constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment because no "racially
discriminatory purpose" is present.220 Likewise, the technique is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment, as there is no
expectation of privacy in abandoned genetic material, 22 ' and the
result of a familial search provides investigators with more
probable cause than is present from a conventional lead.222
However, it is clear from recent breakthroughs in decades-old
murder cases, as well as the resulting apprehension of several
serial killers, that the benefits of responsible familial DNA
techniques far outweigh any disproportionate effects on the
African American community. In the end, it will fall to the states
to decide how comfortable they are with familial DNA testing.
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Racial issues must be a part of this conversation, and conventional
DNA safeguards against consideration of race by law enforcement
must be maintained in the familial DNA context. But one must
never forget that DNA is a proxy for life, and, in Juan Rivera's
case, a life hangs in the balance.
